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CHAPTF:R I
INTROilJCTION

Until recently, the general public, educato!'s 1 and the legal pro.fession
have had little concern about student personal appearance rights in the
public educational system.

F\lrthermore, the whirlwind of controversy that

existed over these rights, at tirst glance, appeared trivial.

However, the

legal and personal issues involved are serious.
The student wants the beneti t of a public education without sacrificing
any of his legal or personal rights.

But the availability or public education

is of neoessi ty orten BUbject to compliance with school regulations goveming
student appearance and conduct.

The school 'a rules and regulations are to

establish efficient, effective, and orderly public schools so that the
process of education my successfUl.ly continue.

This results in a con-

frontation between the right or the public school to establish student
appearance regulations and the legal and personal rights of the student.
The courts are petitioned "to review the legality of such regulations
and may order reinstatement or enrollment when the exclusion is made pursuant

to regulations that are unreasonable, arbitrary, or discriminatory, or when
1

2

the exclusion inf'ringes upon some constitutional right.•

l

As

a result, both

federal and state cou:rts have been criticized by educators, students, the
general public, and the legal profession.
Ira Jlarienhoft, a New York educator er! ticized court decisions by
'tll"itings
• • • the courts will succeed eventually in immobilizing the school's
ability to control conduct, prescribe standards and set educational goal.a
• • • they have obstructed the disciplinary function of the school regarding the removal of troublesome students who make it impossible for other
students to leam • • • • They have dEnied the right • • • to prescribe
standards or suitable dress. The courts have prevented the training
or the young in the awareness of reaponsibili ties that are oonnensurate
with rights and privileges• • • • The rights of those disturbed are as
nothing compared to the •right of this child to an education." Just
'why the courts have been more solicitous in this matter than in the
rights of those others to their education is a question not answered.
Indeed,· that question is not even raised. Counsel for the students
must be present, and no mention is made of counsel for the multitudes
that wish to learn but cannot because the courts have ordered the
miscreant to remain.
Do the courts really care••• ? 'Where does the responsibility
of the school as the protector of the socia.l values end? What happens
when the students understand that· no decision of the school is .final,
that the teachere have no means to enforce standards o~ honesty,
probity, and integrity that ma.7 not be assaulted in the ·courts and
there find a sympathetic judgement?. • • The courts intrude with
alacrity into areas of which they are ignorant, with rulings that
herald the end ot restraint and responsibility by the school in
deference to the presumed rights of students who will listen to no
regulations because the courts havf become boards of education as the
latter have become debating clubs.

1John E. Bugg, "Constitutional Law-Public School Authorities Regulating
the Style of a Student .'s Hair," North Carolina Law Review,

1968), 1n.

47

(December,

2rra Marienhoff, "The Courts and the Schools: a Dissent," Social
Fducation, XII (December, 1967), PP• n9-720.

3
Although this point of view is not held by the majority of educators, a
vocal minor! ty has made known its position.
Various positions are held by the students.

Some students appear to

agree with the position stated by the American Civil Liberties Union.

It

states that "While admitting that an individual's opinion is ueually expressed
through the written or spoken word, ••• •personal taste in dress and groom-

:1ng is another technique in self expression. '"

3

These students and the

American Civil Liberties Union contend that education should not be granted
on the basis of personal appearance.

In general, these students believe

that •as long as a student •s appearance does not in fa.ct disrupt the educa-

tional process, or constitute a threat to safety, it should not be of any
concern to the school."h Other students believe that school rules should
be followed until they may be changed by students and administrators.

still a third group believes authority should be unquestioned.

And

Similar

views are held by the general public.

The legal profession's position is delineated by Mr. Ga?Tison when he
wrote a

As a general rule decisions of school boards affecting the
good order &."'ld discipline of the school are .fi.~ when they relate to the right of pupils to enjoy school privileges. Courts

3"Civil Liberties,"American Civil Liberties Union, (January, 1966) 1

P• .3.
livarvin R. Pl.asco, "School Student Dress and Appearance Regulations,•
Cleveland-Marshall Law Review, 18 (January., 1969) 1 149.

4
are not concerned with errors of judgement, but the reasonableness of regulations is a question of law tor the courts despite
the presumption that such regulations are a reasonable exerciae
of discretion. Whether a l'lll.e is reasonable is aubjeot to inquiry by the courts, and they may compel, by mandamls, the S
directors of a school to admit a pupil unlawful.lT excluded.
·which position represents a true picture of the law'l It ia the purpose
of this thesis to trace the developamt of court deciaiona in the tm.ited

states which have in.f'luenced and determined students• personal appearance
rights in public high schools between 1900 and 1968. The cases will be
presented and interpreted so that the reader can understand how the courts
have reached these decisions and then decide which position is the JOOat

representative of the law.
Certain limitations were made in researching this thesis. One was to
limit research to student appearance casee at the secondary public school

level. A second was to limit prilllBrT resource research to official and
unotf"icial state supreme oourt and federal court reporters because the
lower state courts do not require court transcripts for eaoh

case and

cause there is no categorization of lower state court decisions.

be-

A third

limitation was that although the writer is not a legal expert, she baa

presented the law with aome interpretation for the reader.

The reader

should be cautioned that only legal background and :tnterpret&'!::4_on which is
necessary to understand the courta' decisions is provided.

Sserge H. Oe.rrison, "Rill.ea and Regulations-Reasonableness and Validity1 "

North Dakota Law Revift', 37 (January, 1961) 1 122.

5
In order to present an accurate study of the development of court

decisions the thesis is divided into five separate and distinct chapters.
Chapter one evaluates the need, purpose, and format of' the thesis.

Chapter

two examines the adJD:lnistrative agency, state court procedure, and early
state court decisions.

Chapter three is similar to chapter two; however,

it concerns itself with later state court decisions.

Chapter four sorutia-

izea the federal district courts' and the United States supreme Court's
procedure and decisions.

In chapter .:rive, the administrative agency 1a

sumnarized, a synopsis of the state court, federal district court, and
United States Supreme Court•a procedure is presented, conclusions as to
court decisions are deduced, and recommendations for .further research are
ma.de.

It should also be noted that each chapter has an introduction, body

of information, 8UDll'Dllr:y1 and conclusions.
In addition, the footnotes for all the legal references are cited

according to legal form and the footnotes for all non-legal re.ferences are
cited according to standard thesis form.

This is done for the reader• s

convenience so that the reader may Without dif.:riculty refer to the sources
he may wish to examine.
In summary, there is recent concern over the confrontation between the
right of the public school to establish student appearance regulations so

that the educative process may continue and the legal and personal rights of
the student.
disputes.

The courts are petitioned to settle the legality or such

.And they, in tum, are criticized by educators, students, the

general public, and the legal profession.

Divergent views are held in each

6
group, but enough questions are asked by all the groups to establish the
need for the research study presented.

The purpose of this thesis is to

answer these questions by tracing the development

or

court decisions in

the United States which have influenced and determined students' personal

appearance rights in public high schools between 1900 and 1968.

CHAPTER II
PRF,-DRPRESSION STUDENT DRESS RIGHTS AT THF. STATE COURT LEVEL

Before beginning a chronological stuey of student appearance cases at
the state level, it is necessaey to ascertain the purpose of an administrative agency, to determine the school board's role as an administrative
agency, and to understand the relationship bet'Ween the school board and the
state courts.
An administrative agency is created by the legislature and its authority'

is restricted to the power it is delegated by the legislature.

Since the

legislature may not delegate more power than it has, the administrative
agency's authority is f'llrther restricted b,y the federal and state constitutions.

The agency's .functions have been compared and contrasted with the
legislative, executive, and judicial functions of the government.

The

legislative function establishes a future course of conduct tor a group of
people by ma.king rules.

The executive .function enforces these rules.

'While the judicial function of the agency adjudicates or determines the
present rights and duties based on a past incident, many times these .functions
overlap and merge.
In general, the government and the people have recognized administrative

7

8
agencies as an essential part of our governmental structure. Attormt7 Gen-

eral iilrst in l9S5' said, •ThaJ' were created as a neceua17 -8D8 tor protecting public intereeta 1'hich could not be nitabq protected. b,r the ooarta

or other means ••••.Administrative agencies mat be enabled and pend.tted

to 1\lnction ef.f.lcientq and eftectiveq it the public interest wtd.cth 18
their J>rial'7 concern, 18 to be preaervect.• 6

The administrative ageney1 1n thia inatance the aohool board, prorldea
a specialised and orderq proceu to Mf'ill the needs ot a pa.rticular aeement of 1ociet7. A great number of people are not autticientq attectecl
b,r 80llle action

to assert their interests in a judicial proceeding whioh

any consider aa awkard, al.ow, and expaud.ve.

The administrative agenq

offers theae people convenient, specialised., and apeedT decisions.
In D.l.inois, as in moat atatea, the legislature delegates power to the

school board by 8&J'ing that the aohool board ahall have the PQRl" •
adopt and enforce all neceU&l"T rulea for

t o

the aanagement and goyermnent ot

the public school.a of their diatriot.•7 The statute gives the aobool board

the power to achieve the baaio objectiTe of edllcation.
in

The school suld be

a chaotic state uneu1table tor teaching and leaming without rules ade

6Jamea lilrst, The Growth or •ncan Law (st. Paul, 19SO) at la23.

7111. Rev. stat. (1967) ch. 122, I l<>-20.s.

9
and en.forced b.r the school board or its representatives.

However, the

8 tatute

is not to be interpreted as giTing dictatorial powers to the school

board.

The school board nm.st follow an orderly procedure while making,

enforcing, or adjudicating.

otherwise, there w01ld be a violation ot the

individual's rights to due process of law as guaranteed by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the lhl.ted States Constitution.
If' the individual believes he is adversely' affected or aggrieved

because of an agency action, he has recourse to judicial review by a cOlll't.

Oeneral.J:,-1 the court 'Will review the agency action to determine if an individual's rights have been Violated only arter all administrative avenues

are exhausted.

In moat cases, the court cannot determine if the individual

was aggrined by the adad.niatrative ageney until the administrative

r~ee

are extauated.
Once the court does decide to review the action, it •7 review all ti.
administrative functions.

To enmi.ne the rule, the court generall.y applies

a three part validity' teat which states "a legielative rule is valid•• • it

it is (a) w.1.th1.n the granted power, (b) issued pursuant to proper procedure~
8
and (c) reasonable." If' the rule cloea not violate the three part validity
teat, it ie ae binding on the court as a etatute.

Ir there ia a Violaticm

8xenneth o. Davia, Adminiatrattve Law Text (1~9) hereinafter cited aa
Davia 1 at 87.

10

of this test, the school board's decision cannot stand.
The areas of enforcement and adjudication are difficult to distinguish.

Fnforcement may be the result of adjudication, or it may occur as a separate,
independent function,. or it may be a separate, independent function which
is later ratified by the board in its adjudicating capacity.

The court uses

the substantial-evidence rule to review the board •a action 1n the areas of
enforcement and adjudication.

This rule llmits its elf to the reasonableness

test in revienng findings of .tact while deciding questions of law.

Ques-

tions of law include constitutional law, statutory law, common law, administrative jurisdiction, .fair administrative procedure, arbitrary or
capricious action, and abuse of discretion.
If the statute does not prescribe the methods by which and the circumstances in 1¥hich administrative action is to be reviewed by the court, the
individual my resort to extraordinary remedies.

The purpose of these

remedies is to enforce a right or to prevent the violation of an individual's
rights.

These remedies include write of mandams, prohibition, quo warranto,

certriorari, habeas corpus, and many others.

Sometimes the individual may

also seek injunctive relief in the court of equity.

It is up to the individ•

ual to seek the proper avenue to have his case reviewed by the court.
case will not be reviewed unless he chooses the proper remedy.

His

However, if

the statute has indicated other methods and circumstances for administrative
action to be reviewed, the court is unlikely to permi. t these remedies to be

used.

11

P!nally, it must be kept in mind that the court is not to assume the

power delegated to the school board and overtum decisions which are with:ln
the discretion of the board.

The court ia only to review deciQions to

prevent an abllee of power.
The first recorded case regarding student appearance 1"8gulations was
llcCaskill v. Bowar.9 lfr. McCaskill sought to restrain the superintendent
and public school trustees from refusing admission to his two sons because
they had :failed to comply with a regulation which stated". • • each male

pupil over four feet and six inches in height and between certain named
ages is required to wear a uniform which costs the sum of $13 • • • • r.

10

He alleged that the regulation was unconst:ttutional.

Relief was denied by the Georgia court because Mr. McCasld.ll bad not

chosen the proper procedure to :f'ollow.

He should have alleged that the

ru.le was enforced and then sought a lfrit of mandanus to compel the school
officials to admit his children.
In Carr v. Inhabitants of the Town of Dighton,

expelled from school because they were lia....ridden,
readmitted once the situation ws corrected.

9126 Ga. 3411 54 S. E. 942 (1906).

11

lOid. at

943.

299 Mass. 3041 ll8 N. E. 52$ (1918).

11

the Carr children were
~t

they were to be

The jury was to decide if

12
the school committee acted in good .faith.

The juey was not asked to deter-

111.ne if the school board's regulation •s reasonable, hit on.17 if their
regulation was enforced with dne regard to the rights of the Carr tamil.Y'•
There were five points for the jury to consider.

The7 werel

(1) Mr.

Carr said the school committee did not give him the opportunit,. to be heard,
(2) later one member of the school board stated there was a misunderstanding
in not giving

Mr. CalT a hearingt (3) only" three of

the five children ware

e:xairdned far lice before sending all five children home from ach>ol, (b)
there was teatimon.7 that the children ware free of bead lice, and

Garr referred to the revenge.fulness of the teachers.

(5)

lfr.

The jur;r decided tor

Mr. Carr.

The legal encyclopedia, 09!"R}!S Juris Seoundum., atateai
The decision of such board, if exercised in good faith, on natters
affecting the good order and discipline of the school is final as
far aa it relates to the rights of pupile to enj07 school privileges, and the courts w.Ul not interfere with the exercise of such
authority unless it has been illegally" or unreasonably" exercisedJ
but the courts will interfere to prevent
enforcement of a rule
which deprives the pupil of rights. • • •

tie

The school committee was not acting in good f'aith since it did not follow the
proper procedure which would give Mr. Carr the opportunity to present his

aide of the issue.

If it ware evident that the school comnittee had follond

the proper procedure of granting Mr. C&?T a hearing and safeguarding his

legal rights, this case would not have been left to the jury to determine the
.facts. Ho tactual issues of whether the school com:lttee • s acting 1n good
taith 110ulcl have occurred.
12 79

c.

J.

s.

Schools and School District.a 8494 (1952).

In Valentine v. Independent School District, the school board was
accused of being unreasonable and arbitrary in the making of a regulation.

13

After Miss Valentine successfully completed four years of high school, she
Her cl.ass was told by the school board and superin-

was ready to graduate.

tendent that they were to wear caps and gowns .tor the graduating CereD10n1"•

Miss Valentine rented her cap and gown and bad them fumigated.

She

told by the health peywician that they still might be contagious.
addition, they' also bad an

extr~

Valentine and her classmates.

Qoi

waa
In

offensive smell which sickened I.ti.as

graduation night, all but three members

of the class refused to wear the caps and gowns.

OnJ.7 these three members

received their diplomas.
In order to enter collage Miss Valentine needed her high aohool record
and her diploma.

claimed that

The superintendent refused to relinquish them because he

the7 were

his private property.

Miss Valentine took her plea

to a trial court asking for a writ of mandanns to have the records and
diploma delivered to her.

The trial court decided against her.

She then went to the higher court on appeal.

The court granted her

the writ stating •. • •we are of opinion that the order of the board was

unreasonable and arbitrary• and therefore such a rule as the bo#J ...1 had not
a right to make, and that the board exceeded 1te powera.•14

13187 la. 555 1 17h

-

14Id. at 339.

N.

w. 334 (19l9)J 191

la. llOO, 183 N. W.

434 (1921).

Two years later the Independent School District was still fighting the
writ of mandamus given to Miss Valentine.

this decree.

The Iowa Supreme Court confirmed

The court then 119nt on to says

The wearing of a cap and gown on commencement night has no relation to educational values, the discipline of the school, scholastic grades, or intellectual advancement. Such a rule may be
justified in some instances from the viewpoint of economy1 but
f'rom a legal viewpoint the board might as well attempt to direct
the wearing of overalls by the boys and calico dresses by the
girls. The enforcement of such a rule is purely arbitrary and
especially so when the o.f'fending pupil has been passed for graduati on af"ter the performance on her part of all prescribed educational requiremaits. We are not questioning the propriety of
wearing capa and gowne. It is a custom we approve. The board
may deny the right of a graduate to participate in the~public
ceremony of graduation unless a cap and gown is worn.15
The court did not :recognise a relationship between oaps and gowns for
graduation and educational values.

As a result, the superintendent and

school board 1'9re forced to release Miss Valentine's records and diploma.

But the court did recognise the board's right to elCClude graduates from
participating in the ceremony if they did not comply with their rnle.
Another case in which the reasonableness ot a regulation •a the

issue was Jones v.

naz. 16

The board of trustees of a public agricultural

high school in Mississippi bad passed two regulations that Jlr. Jones

sought injunctive relief to perpetually enjoin the enforce.nt

or and to

have these two regulations null and void. The first regulation •s that

l5Id. at 436, 437.

-

l.6i21 Miss. 1361 89 So. 906 (1921) 1 18 A. L. R. 61.6 (1922).

15
the students were required to wear khaki uniforms and that the students

were to own no more nor less of these uniforms than specified.

The second

regulation Mr. Jones objected to was that all students were to wear at all
times (including weekends) the prescribed khaki uniforms when visiting

public places within five miles or the school.
The lower court found that the orders of the board of tl'llstAies were

not so unreasonable since the testimony indicated that the uni.forms aided
in school discipline.

!kt.t the court added" • • • if it is the purpose to

invade the home and undertake to say what the children should 'W98.r at home,
that 110uld be unreasonable. n1 7

The Mi.seissippi Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decree.
higher court reasoned since this

"Ml8

an agricultural school With a

tor;r, the school was acting in loco parentis.

The
do~

This meant the school bad

the authority to control the pupil when he was in school.

Po;.,;;:-c:ling students

were to follow the rules at all times since the school was acting in place

of their parents.

Day students were to .follow the l'llles and regulations

on the way to school, 1n school, and on the •7 home.

Once home, the

parents reswned their role and the student becam a child under the direc-

tion of his parents.

Jones v. Paz was interesting because it clearly' de-

fined the school's role as in loco parentis and the parent's role as natural

parents.

18

17M· at 906.
18,!g.

16
At times the reviewing courts differ as to determining why the actions
The case of Pugalez v. Sellmeyer is an

of a school should be upheld.

example of suoh a disagreement. 19 Miss Pugsley,, an eighteen year old

woman,, refused to submit or obey the rule that stated, "The wearing of
transparent hosiery,, low-necked dresses,, or any style of clothing tending
toward immodesty in dress,, or the use of face paint or cosmetics, is
prohibited." 20
Miss Pugsley was told to wash the talcum powder off her face and not

to return to school with 1t on.

She returned, offered herself as a student,

but was denied admission because she infringed the rule by continuing to
use talcum powder on her face.

She then re:f\lsed to obey the rule and •s

denied admission.

Miss Pugsley went to court to petition for a w.rit of mandams to
conpel the defendants to reinstate her as a pupil in the public school.
Before the court l'IOuld decide if there were an issue, both the school
board and Vise Pugsley wmld have to follow the proper procedure.

Since

Miss Pugsley did not follow the proper procedure by first app:cying for
relief' to the school directors,, the court did not have an administrative
action to review.

The lower court denied her relief.

19158 Ark. 247,, 2$0
20

-Id. at 1213.

s.

YT.

538 1 30 A. L. R. 1212 (1923).

17
She then took her case to the Arkansas Supreme Court.

It denied the

appeal and upheld the lower eourt•s decision even though the Supreme Court
said the wrong reason was given.

The higher court held the rule -was not

void and relief should have been denied on that ground.
The following section very concisely stated the sentiment of the
Arkansas Supreme Courts
Courts have other and more important .functions to perform than that
of hearing the complaints of disaffected pupils of the public schools
against rules and regulations promu1gated by the school boards for
the government o:f' the schools. The courts have this right of review,
for the reasonableness of such rule is a judicial question, and the
courts will not ref\lse to perform their .functions in determining the
reasonableness of such rules, when the question is presented. But,
in doing so, it will be kept in mind that the directors are elected
by the patrons of the schools over which they preside, and the election occurs annually. These directors are in close and intimate
touch with the affairs of their respective districts, and know the
conditions with which they have to dea.l.. It will be remembered also
that respect for constituted authority and obedience thereto are an
essential lesson to qualify one for the duties of citizenship, and
that the schoolroom is an appropriate place to teach that lessonJ
so that the oourts hesitate to substitute their 'Will and judgment
for that of the school board.8 1 which are delegated by law as the
agencies to prescribe rules for the government of the pu~ic schools
of the state, which are supported at the public expense.

!be majority of the Arkansas Supreme Court believed that the school
board as an administrative agency 11&.s to •ke rules, enforce these rnles,
and adjudicate if necessa?"71 since it •s more .familiar with these areas as
far as education was concerned.

21

~. at 1215.

'1'he court also thought that rules taught

18
respect for authority which was an important lesson for citizenship that
the school was to teach. And finally the court indicated that if the
public was not satisfied with the school board and its rules, it could
elect new members at the next annual election.

This sentiment appeared

to be the attitude of most state court in pre-depression days.
However, Pu.gslez v. Sel.lmeyer was the first case in which there was
a dissenting opinion. 22 JUstice Hart was the first justice to publlcal.q
question the reasonableness and discretion of a school rule as tar as
student dress was concerned.

He said,

••• I think that a rule forbidding a girl pupil of her age from
putting talcum powder on her face is so tar unreasonable and beyond the exercise of discretion that the court should. say that
the board of directors acted without authority in making and enforcing it. "11.aeless lawa diminish the authority of necessary
ones." The tone of tbe majority opinion exemplifies the wisdom
of thie old proverb.23
In People

ex re1• Lamme I•

BugkJ.and. Mr. Lamme 1 s daughter •• expelled

from school because she refused to comply' 'With a rule ma.de by the school
committee which prescribed uniforms to be worn by the girls. 24 Mr. Lamme
petitioned in his daughter's behalf for a writ of mandams to compel her
reinstatement in the high school. Both the lower and higher courts denied
22158 Ark, 247, 250 S. vr. 538 30 A. L. R. 1212 (192.3).
1

23rd. at 1216.
2
4a4 Colo. 2401 269 P. 15 (1928).

-
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Mr. Lamme's daughter relief.

board's rules and regulations.

Neither Colorado court commented on the school
Instead, the court commented that

had not followed the proper procedure.

Mr.

Lanna

He should have exhausted all admin-

istrative avenues, in this case the county superintendent.

An expert in

the field of administrative law, Mr. Kenneth Davis, very nicely summarizes
the courts• basis for their reasoning by' saying, "• •• every court requires

exhaustion when the question presented is one 'Iii.thin the ageney•a specialization and when the administrative remedy' is u likely as the judicial
remedy to provide the wanted reliet.•

25

Since the superintendent and the

school board were a specialized administrative agency, all avenues of
relief had to be attempted before the court would review the administrative
action.
It should be noted that again aa in fugae1y v. Sellmezer, there •s
a dissenting opinion. 26 One justice of the Colorado Supreme Court felt that
the question should have been heard by' the court.

Although it is not clearJ.7

stated in the record that the justice -.s in agreement nth Mr. Lanna and
his daughter, overtones suggested that the justice might have been sympathetic to them.
In sumary, the school board is recognized as a specialized adminis-

25Davis at 356.

26158 Ark. 247 250 S.
1

w. 538 1

30 A. L. R. 1212 (1923).
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trative agency capable of rule making, enforcement, and adjudication within
the authority granted by the legislature and further limited by the federal

and state constitutions.

Its purpose is to manage the schools so that the

process of education may successfully continue.

If the individual believes that the administrative action has violated
his rights 1 he bas recourse to judicial review by a court.

The court will

normally review administrative agenoy action only when the proper legal
procedure is followed.

But the court is not limited to reviewing one

function of the administrative agency.
uses the three part validity test.

To review rule making, the court

To review the areas of enforcement

and adjudication, the court uses the substantial-evidence rule.

However,

the purpose of the court is not to usurp the author:i.ty granted to the

school board, but to be certain there is no abuse of power by the school
board and its representatives.

All litigation concerning student dress and appearance has occurred
in the t119lltieth century.

There were three pre-depression instances of

parents wishing to enjoin school boards from making and enforcing rules
which prescribed uniforms.

In

1906,

in the case of McCaskill v. Bower,

the Georgia Supreme Court eliminated the case .from review because M:r.

Mccaskill

failed to select the proper remedy and did not allege that the

rule bad been enforced. 27

27126 Ga. 3Ll, Sh

s.

Fifteen years later in the case of Jones v. Day,

E. 942 (1906).
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the proper procedure was used.

28

The Mississippi court upheld a rule re-

quiring uniforms as valid and reasonable because the school indicated it
assisted in maintaining discipline. Seven years later in People ex rel.
Lamme

v. Bucklan<\, the court did not comment on the uniform requirement

regulation because the plaintiff had not exhausted all administrative
avenues. 29
In the case of Carr v. Inhabitants of the Town of Dighton, the rights

of the Carr family were violated.30 A rule prohibiting lice-ridden children
from attending school was reasonable, but the court overturned the board's
action.

The school board did not follow the proper procedure of granting a

hearing and discriminated against the Carr tamily.
In Valentine v. IndeP!11dent School District_, the Court reserved the
right to see if a rule was related to educational objectives. 31 It declared
a rule unreasonable which provided for withholding the high school records

and diploma of a student for refusing to wear a cap and gOltl'l during the
graduation ceremny. But the court did recognize the board's right to
require students to 119B.r caps and gowns if they were to participate in
the graduation ceremony.

28i27 Miss. 1361 89 So.

906 (1921) 1 18 A. L. R. 6ltS (1922).

2984 Colo. 240, 269 P. lS (1928).
30299 Mass. 3041 118 N. E. 525 (1918).
3l187 la. 555 1 174 N. W. 334 (l919)J 191 la. 11001 183 N. W. 434 (1921).
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The court in Pugsley v. Sel,lmeyer suheld a dress rule made by the
school board. 32 The court did not look to the educational objectives ot
the rule and it assumed the rule to be valid until proven invalid.

The

court also indicated the school board was better suited than the court

to decide if the rule was neoessar;r. Only Justice Harlan questioned the
rule's reasonableness, but he did not explain his legal basis .for this conclusion.
An explanation for the limited number of student dress litigation might

be traced back to Pritt v. Snodqys.33 This case -was cited in most student
dress cases.

Mr. Pritt questioned the right of the school board to regulate

social activities outside of school. The Missouri court confirmed the board's
right to regulate.

The concurring opinion stated the court's position.

It

sa.id.1 "'When the school room is entered by the pupil, the authority of the
parent ceases, and that of the teacher beginsJ when sent to his home, the
authority of the teachers ends, and that of the parent is resumed.

For his

conduct when at school, he my be punished or eTen expelled, under the proper
oircumatancesJ for his conduct when at home, he is subject to domestic con-

troi. n.34 Another reason for limited litigation might

be

that the public

32158 Ark. 247 250 S. w. 538 30 A. L. R. 1212 (1923).
1
1
3366 Mo. 286, 27 Am. R. 343 (1877).

34rd1 at 298.
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agreed with the rules and regulations made by the school board. Perhaps,
the administrative agency because of its power to make rules, enforce, and
adjudicate, settled many disputes.

Or

an alternative ml.ght be that it was

easier to comply with the rule or regulation than to litigate.
The

following conclusions may be reached after

this chapter:

an~ing

the oases in

(1) the school board's right to make rules that regulate

studE11t dress and appearance was established, (2) the courts preferred to
let the school board settle disputes, (.3) both the school board and the
individual were to follow the proper procedure, (4) the three part validity
test •s applied by the court to determine the legality of the school rule,

(5) the court, in Jcnea v. Day and

in Pue;slez v. Sellmezer, accepted the

school board's rule as reasonable without questioning the purpose or objective& of the rule, (6) the minority opinion in Pugsl& v. Sellmeyer accused
the school board's rule of being unreasonable, bu.t gave no criteria tor
this conclusion, and (7) the court in Valentine v. Ind!P!!!dEllt School District

questioned the board's educational objectives before determining if' the
rules were reasonable • .35

3S127

Miss. 1.36, 89 So. 906 (1921) J 158 Ark. 2471 250 s. W. 5381 30
A. L. R. 1212 (1923)J .!!!•J 187 la. 555, 174 N. w. 3.34 (1919)J 191 la. noo,
18.3 N. w. 434 (1921).

CHAPTER III
POST-DF.PRFSSION STUD'F:NT DRFSS RIGHTS AT THE STATR COORT LEVEL

The administrative agency's purpose and ill.notions in post-depression

cases is the same as its pre-depression role.

The administrative agency

has been recognized by the government and the people as a necessary part
in our governmental structure.

Its purpose is to fulfill the needs ot

It offers convenience, special-

the people in a specialized capacity.

ization, and speediness in reaching a decision.

In a society as large

as this one, this is an indispensable service.
The administrative agency, in this instance, the school board, derives
its authority from the legislature.

The legislature may limit the adminis-

trative agency as it sees necessary and further restrictions are made by
the federal and state constitutions.

Generally, the school board may make

rules, enforce, or adjudicate to secure the best possible educational
results as long as the individual's rights are not violated and the proper
procedure is followed.
If an individual feels he has been aggrieved by the administrative
agency action, he may seek redress. Administrative remedies are available
and usually should .f'lrst be exhausted be.fore petitioning the court to review
the administrative agency's actions.

24
:''

2$

The court may review all or part of the administrative ageney•e functions

if it .find.a it necessary:

••• to prevent the enforcement of a rule which deprives a pupil
of rights to which the law entities him or which tends to alienate
the pupil .from proper parental authority, or which manifestly
reaches beyond its sphere or action, and relates to subjects in no
way connected with the management or successful operation of the
school, ar which is plainl.T calculated to subvert or l"l~rd the
leading object of the school legislation of the state.J
Generally, the court applies the three part validity test to examine the
administrative agency rule.

This three part test states "• •• a legisla-

tive rules is valid • • • if it is (a) within the granted power, (b) issued

pursuant to proper procedure, and (c) reasonable." 37 In the areas of the
board's enforcement and adjudication of school rules, the court uses the
substantial-evidence rule.

This rule limits itself to the reasonableness

test in reviewing tacts while deciding questions of law.
In some states, the methods by which and the circumstances in 1'hich
administrative action is to be reviewed by the court is not specified.
In these instances, the individual may use extraardinar,y remedies or injunctive relief in a court of equity to enforce a right ar to prevent the
violation of his rights.

3679

c.

J.

s.

37navis at 87.

It is important to remember that the individual

Schools and School Districts 1494 (19S2).
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has the responsibility for selecting the proper remedy.

If the statute

establishing the administrative agency indicates methods and circumstances
for administrative action to be reviewed, the court probably will not
permit other remedies to be used.
Lastly, it mst be remembered that the court is only to review decisions
to prevent an abuse of power.

It is not to overturn decisions which are

within the discretion and delegated power of the board to make.
The first post-depression case was Stromberg v. French. JB

The school

board passed a rule which said, " ••• after September 291 19301 any boy
wearing heel plates on his shoes w.ill be refused admittance to classes and
will be suspended or expelled until the heel plates are removed. ..

39

Murray

Stromberg complied with the rule after he and several other boys were asked
to do so.

Later, when his mther noticed that he bad removed the heel

plates, she questioned him and had him replace them.
1'.'hen Murray wore the shoes with the heel plates to school, the school

authorities sent him home.
the heel plates.

He was told he could return when he had removed

His father, Mr. Stromberg, was informed of the action by'

the school board and met 111 th them.

Mr. Stromberg insisted that he had

the right to determine his son's dress at school.

.3 860

N. D. 7501 2.36 N. Vi. 477 (1931).

39rd. at 478.

-

The school board disagreed •
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As a result, Mr. Stromberg sought to enjoin the school board from enforcing the rule which he considered arbitrary and unreasonable.

The lower

trial court upheld the rule as a reasonable one and also upheld the school
board's right

to enforce it.

The decision was appealed by lfr. Stromberg.

The North Dakota Supreme Court was asked to decide several issues.
review the rule, they applied the three part validity test.

court found that the school board

To

The higher

was granted its authority by the legisla-

ture and also indirectly from the state and federal constitutions.

Next,

the court noted that the proper procedure was foll01'8d by the school board
:fn

its enactment and enforcement of the rule. In the court's opinion, the

rule was reasonable because it was aimed at the conservation of school pro-

perty and the maintenance of good school order and discipline.
The higher court •s also asked to determine if the right of the parents

to educate, discipline, and direct their children. was paramount to the public
interest.

The North Dakota court agreed with the trial court that the rule

did not cause a hardship or indignity to the Stranberg family, and that the
public interest in education ..as paramount to the parent's rights.

The plaintiff in his issues also asked if the school board would be
able to absolutely prescribe apparel.

The court replied that the safeguard

of reasonableness in the three part validity test would prevent this from
occurring.
Finally, the plaintiff claimed that Murray should not be expelled for

28
insubordination because there was no malice nor a willful disregard of rules
on Murray's part.

He was an obedient son following his parents' direction.

The North Dakota Supreme Court .found J.hrray to be insubordinate.

To explain

its reasoning the court said, "No rule or regulation could be enforced,
provided the parent directed the pupil not to observe it."

40

Relief was denied Mr. Stromberg and judgment of the lower court was
af'.f'irmed•

. The case of

AntelJ. v, stokes

primarily' dealt with secret

organizations~

The school committee passed a rule prohibiting secret organizations,

part of the rule mentioned dress.

One

It stated, "The wearing of jerseys,

sweaters, caps, or other conspicuous evidence or membership in an unapproved
secret organization is hereby .forbidden on the school premiaes."la
Mr. Antell asked for a writ of mandamus.

He •nted the court to deter-

mine if the school committee had the authority to regulate secret student
organizations,

Musacho.setts' statutory law gave the school committee the

right to supervise and control all athletic and other organisations when
they are connected with the school.

The court interpreted this right to

mean, "Rules adopted by the constituted authorities for the goverance of
40rd, at 480

~87 Mass. 362, 191 N. E. 407 (1934).
42Id, at 4o8

-
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public schools must be presumed to be based upon mature deliberation and
.for the welfare of the co:rmnunity."43

The court dismissed the petition.

Although no comment was made about student dress by neither the court nor

Mr. Antell, this case was included in this study' to accuratel.7 trace the
chronological development of student dress cases.
In Matheson v. Brady, a petition :f'or a writ of mandamus was sought to

compel the defendant to permit Mr. Jlatheson•s daughter to attend classes in

alacks. 44 In their briefs, neither party used the proper procedure in stating that the Forest Park High School was part of the state school system.
The Georgia Superior Court aaid1

There is no allegation that it is a part of the State School System.,
either as a count.1-wide school system or an independent school syatemJ
and in the absence of such allegation, there is no official duf;J'
alleged• • • • There is nothing in the petition that designates the
Forest Park High School as being a part of the State School s,atem,
any more than as a private school. Even though, in fact, it be a
part of the State School System, this court, oould not take judicial
cognizance thereof under the Code, I 38-112.Lc:>
This section of the Georgia code limtted the court's cognizance or previous

court records on the same case which would have given the necessary information.

As a result, since it 198.s not stated as part of the Georgia school

system and the code prevented the court from referring to the records, the
petition was dismissed.
43~. at 407.
44202 Ga.

-

5001 43

16Id. at 704.

S. E. 2d 703 (1947).
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The case of Mitchell v, McCall was unique.

46

Eulene Mitchell was sus-

pended from a public school in Alabama for refusing to (a) wear the prescribed

gym costume, (b} perform certain physical exercises, and (c} attend the
physical education course because her attendance would require her to be
present when the other girls wore the prescribed costumes and performed the
exercises she considered innodest and sinful.

The school board and the

Mitchell family reached a compromise on the costume and the exercises,

The

Alabama Supreme Court • s only oonoemed with Eulene 's physic.al a ttend.ance.

Mr. Mitchell claimed Eulene's attendance would be a violation of her religious
rights secured by the state and federal constitutions.
The court pointed out that Alabama was under no constitutional obligation to provide public schools and school attendance was not required.

Bo.t

a statute did require a physical education course to be e&?Tied out in the
public, private, and parochial schools of the state.
The court reasoned that Eulene did have the right to make use of state
:facilities, and that n, •• the

State of Alabama can place reasonable, non-

discrim.1.nating conditions on the privilege of attending public schools since
such attendance is voluntary,"

47

It was also noted that the school did make

certain concessions because of Eulene's religious beliefs.
The court then stated:

4~73 Ala, 6o41 143 So, 2d 6291 632 (1962}.

47Id.

-

31
All citizens in so far as they hold views different from the majority
of their fellows are subject to such inconveniences. • • .It is precisely every citizens right to be a "speckled bird" that our constitutions, state and federal, seek to insure. And solace for the embarrassment that is attendant upon holding such beliefs must be found
by the individual citizen in his,_JJOral courage and strength of conviction, and not in a court of law.t16
If Eulene did not agree with the court decision, she did not have to go to
school.

For these reasons, the court decided that her constitutional rights

were not violated.
There is no indication that the case of Mitchell. v. McCall was appealed
to the Supreme Court of the United States.

49

It is probable that the United

States Supreme Court wruld have overruled the Alabama Supreme Court decision
because 'Rulene•s religious beliefs were limited by the Alabama court.

Thia

is an infringement of her constitutional rights guaranteed in the First Amend-

ment of the United States Constitution.
One of the leading cases involving rules about the length and style of a
student's hair was Leonard v. School Committee of Attleboro.so After attend:lng classes at his high school for

two

da)rs, George Leonard, a senior,

waa

told to get a haircut and ns not permitted to return to his classes until he
had so done.

George •s a professional :maicia.n since the age of twelve.

He

had performed at the Newport Jazz Festival and the New York World's Fair.

5~49 Mass. 704, 212 N. E. 2d 468, lh A. L. R. 3d 1192 (l96S).

I
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His professional image in part was based on his hair sty-le and a change in
image might affect his success.
His parents requested a hearing to discuss and explain the situation.
However, no settlement was reached betwen the board and the Leonarda.

As a

result, George's parents, in his behalf sought injunctive relief to compel
the school to readmit him.

They also questioned the rule as being unreason-

able and arbitrary since they" believed hair styles had no connection with

the successful operation of the school.

Instead, they felt this to be an

invasion of family privacy.

The Massacmsetts court's reasoning was based on 'two parts of the three
part validity teat.

The court noted that the proper procedure bad been

followed by the school board and its represE!ltatives thus fulfilling one

part of the validity teat.

The court did not cite evidence nor committee

reports to indicate that George•• hair had interfered with discipline.
Instead, the court theorized that the rule •a reasonable b,y sayings
are of opinion that the unusual hair style of the plaintiff could
disrupt and impede the maintenance of a proper classroom atzoosphere
or decorum. Thia is an aspect of personal appearance and hence akin
to matters of dress. Thus, as with any unusual, immodest or exaggerated mde of dress, conspicuous departures f'rom accepted customs
in the ti.litter of haircuts could result in the distraction of other

We

pupUe.!>J.

The reasonable part of the valldi ty test was fulfilled.

S1:rd. at h72.

-
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The court connnented on the Leonard's claim of an invasion of family
privacy.

It felt that the rights of the students, teachers, and others ?.ere

paramount in maintaining an efficient school system.

The last state level student appearance case was Akin v. Board of
Education of Riverside Unified School Distriot.

52

In this case the court bad

to decide if a school regulation that prohibited students .from wearing beards
was an infringement of federal and state constitutionally guaranteed .freedoms.
In September,

19651

Kevin Akin after grOl'ling a beard enrolled at Polytechnic

High School in Riverside.

The school board also in September, 1965 adopted

a good grooming policy which prohibited students from waring beards.

he violated the school policy., Kevin was suspended.

196S-l966 school year
to wear hie beard.

~ .q:'::.ten<led a

Since

For the rest of the

private school where he • s permitted

In the .fall of 19661 Kevin tried to enroll at Polyteclmio

High School, rut he was denied admission because of his beard.

On September 161

1966

Kevin •s pa.rents acting on bis behalf' filed a

petition tor a writ of man.dams in the Superior Court.

The writ was denied.

The Akins appealed to the Califomia state Court of Appeals.

They claimed

that the school board had violated Kevin's constitutional right of .freedom
of speech as expressed in the First Amendment and his constitutional right
of liberty founded in the Fourteenth Amendment.

5268 ea1. Rptr. S57 (1968).

3h
The Akins asked two witnesses to testi.fY.
trom the private school that Kevin attended.

One witness was a teacher
He said that Kevin was a good

student and that there was no discipline problem resulting from Kevin's beard.
The Akins second witness was a bearded student who testified that he had
attended summer school at North High School in Riverside.

He testified that

neither the principal nor teachers directed him to remove the beard and that
there was no incident because of his beard.
The Akins then noted that Kevin •s father 10re a beard and that Kevin

was imitating him.
financ~

They concluded. by saying that they were no longer

able to afford private schooling :fbr Kevin.

The state Court of Appeals reasoned that the school bad ab.om the reg-

ulation to be a reasonable one by citing two examples of difficulties w.i. th

beards.

One example was a foreign student wb:> had a moustache. The boy was

ridiculed.

The other example dealt with a basketball player who also had a

moustache.

Disruption reau1ted when other boys wanted one.

Since an aca-

demic system ia beat served when there i8 no disru.ption 1 the regu.lation

prohibiting beards and moustaches was reasonable.
The court also noted that when the benefit gained by the public outweighed the individual's right1 the public benefit was more important.

F\J.r-

thermore the court pointed out that no other alter.native which was less
subversive of the student's constitutional rights was available.

Lastly, the

court reasoned, citing Leonard v. School Committee of Attleboro as precedent,
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that family privacy must give way to school discipline because community
rights are paramount.53 For these reasons, the lo•r court verdict was up.
held.
In summary, the school board as an administrative agency is to manage

the schools so that the process or education may success:f\lll.y continue.

The

individual has recourse to judicial review by' a court if be believes that
the administrative action only when the proper procedure is followed.
To review rule mak1.ng 1 the court usually uses the three part validity
test.

To review the areas of enforcement and adjudication, the court uses

the substantial.evidence rule.

However, the primary purpose of the court is

to be certain that there is no abuse of authority by the school board and
its representatives.
Between 1931 and 1968, six cases pretained to student dress and appearance.

In five of these instances, the three part validity test was applied.

In 19311 in the case of Stromberg v. French, Mr. Stromberg thought that a

school regulation prohibiting heel plates on shoes was unreasonable.54 The
North Dakota court after reviewing the school board's source of authority,
the procedure used, and the regulation as described in the validity test,
'\

ft>und that the school board had fulfilled the requirements when making and
enforcing the regulation prohibiting heel pl.ates on shoes.

5)349 Mass. 7041 212 N. E. 2d 468, 14 A. L. R. 3 d 1192 (1965).

5~ N. D. '/SO, 236 N. ~~ 477 (1931).

36
In 19341 the case of Antell v. Stokes dealt with a question of the

school committee's authority to regulate organizations.SS

The Massachusett•a

court found that statutory law gave the school committee the right to supervise and control all athletic and other organizations connected 1dth the
school.

Thirty-one years later in Leonard v. School Committee of Attleboro,

the reasonableness of the school regulation determining the length and style

of a student's hair was challenged.56 The Masaachusett•s court noted that
the school has the power to make rules and that the proper procedure had
been followed.

with discipline.
ruption.

It also noted that the hairst.,'le of a student could interfere
The rule was reasonable because it prevented possible dis-

The school board had tulti.lled the validity test.

The fourth instance in llhioh the validity teat was applied ss Matheson

.

v. Brad;y.
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This case failed the proper procedure part of the test.

Neither

party had stated that the high school was a part of the Georgia school sys-

tem.

Georgia statutes prohibit courts from refe?Ting to previous court

records.

.As a result, the petition was dismissed.

The firth and most recent case was Akin v. Board or Education of River-

side Unified School District.58 The reasonableness part of the three part

552a1
56.349

Mass.

362, 191 N. E. 407 (19.34).

lh A. L. R. 3 d ll9'l (1965).
57202 oa. 500 1 43 s. E. 2 d 703 (1947).

5B68

Mass. 704, 212 N. E. 2 d 468,

Cal. Rptr.

551 (1968).
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validity test •s used to determine i f a school regulation prohibiting beards
was not in violation of the student's rights.

The court noted that since

previous beard.a and moustaches caused disruptions in the school, the regulation was a reasonable one.

It also noted that ldlen there is a conflict

between community rights and individual rights, community rights are para-

mount.

The court ruled in favor of the school.

The sixth case, Mitchell v.

McCall, dealt with religious r1ghts.-'9

The

Alabama court found that since there were no requirements for compulsory
school attendance and because concessions had been made for l!Ulene Mitchell's
religious beliefs, she would have to abide with the statute requiring that
a peysical education course be provided for and ful.f:Uled by the students.
This case was not appealled.

If it had been brought to the United states

Supreme Court, it 1t0uld have been interesting to note the court's decision
regarding the constitutionality of the decision.
One explanation for the limited number of post-depression appearance
oases might be the precedent established by pre-depression student appearance
oases.

Individuals considering litigation could have been disheartened by

the court 1 s rulings in the earlier oases which usually found the school

board to be legal.17 correct.

It 'W&8 easier to comply with the rule or reg-

ulation of the school board than to litigate. Another explanation mi.ght be

S9273 Ala. 6o41 1h3 Bo. 2 d 629, 632 (1962).
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that in man7 instances the school board settled the disputes aatistactorily
so that litigation was not necessary.

Still another explanation might be

that the public, in general, agreed. with the school board's rules or regal.a.tiona.
The :tollO'Wi.ng conclusions •7 be reached atter a.nal.1'zing the cases in

this chapter&

(1) the school board's right to regulate student dress and

appearance was re-enforced, (2) proper procedure was to be followed 'b7 both

the school board and the individual, (3) the three part ftliditJ' test .a
applied by the court to determine the legalitJ" or the acbool ru.J.es, (h)
reasonableness of the regulation was proven in Stromperc

Stokes, and Akin

T.

T.

French, .Antell

Tp

Board ot Edu.cation or Rt:veraide Unit:Led School Di.strict,

(S) the court theorized the reasonableness of the acbool regulation in

Leonard T. School Comittee of Attleboro, (6) COJllllllliiJ' rights are paramount

to individual rights in .A.ld..n

T• Board

of F.dncation of Riverside UnUied

School District, and (7) the court in Jfitchell T. »ocall llmited relig1.oua

rights to support a school rule.6o

6060 N. D. 1501 236 N. w. h77 (1931) J 287 Mass. 362 1 191. L E. u07
(193h)J 68 ca1. Rptr. SS7 (1968)1 349 Kasa. 7041 212 N. E. 2 d 468, 14
A. L. R. 3 d 1192 (196S)J 68 Cal. Rptr. SS? (l968)J 273 Ala. 6oh, 143
So. 2 d 629, 632 (1962).
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CHA?l'F,R IV

STUDFtlT DRF28 RIGHTS AT THE FF.I>ERAL DISTRICT
AND UNITED STATJ!l3 SUPRFXF COOR1' LEVELS
The federal district courts have jurisdiction to hear oases where Con-

gresa has specitlcally given them the authority to do so.

The lower federal

courts have no inherent authority in and of themselves to hear any cases.
Congress ha.a invested the lo'Wer federal courts with the power to hear cases
involving civil liberties in Title 281

1343 (1964).

This section statee:

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any

civil action authorized by law to be co•mced by &11' persont
(1) To rt'!COver damages for injucy to his person or property1
or because of the deprivation or any right or priT.ilege of a oitisen of the United States, by any act done in furtherance of any
conspiracy mentioned in section 198$ of Title h2J
(2) To recover damages from any peraon who .fails to prevent or
to aid in preventing any wrongs mentioned in section 198S ot Title
h2 which he had lmowledge were about to occur and powr to preventJ
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color or any State la.w1
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any right,
pri\'ilege or immnity secured by the Constitution ot the United
States or by any Act ot Congress providing for equal r1ghte of
citisens or of all persona 'Within the jurisdiction or the United
State11
(4) To recover daages or to secure equitable or other relief
under any Act of Congress providing '[,fr the protection of civil
rights, including the right to TOte.

~8

u. s. c. A.I 1343 (1964).
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In adjudicating these cases brought before the court, the courts deter-

mine if there has been a violation of the Civil Rights Act ot

196h.

It is

only i.f the individual can show that he is mtitled to relief under this act

that the court may grant relief.
Although the federal courts decide questions of law that stem f'roDl

common law, statutory interpretation, constitutional law, adndnistratift
jurisdiction, fair administratiTe procedure, and protection against arbitrary or capricious action or abllse of discretion, the reader should be
aware that the student personal appearance cases in this chapter are constitutional in nature.

In order to determine the constitutionalitJ' ot a

regulation., the courts• examine the United States Constitution and the
statutory provisions of the Civil Ri.ghts Act of

1964. The reader should

also be cautioned that in the oases in this chapter the courts are only
concemed with the rule making function or the school board and not the
adjudicative function.62

The latter is probably onl1' necee8&1'7 to show

that the rule either has or will be enforced so that the student may show

that he may properly ask the court to intervene to protect h18 civil
rights.
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States differs
from the lower federal courts.

The Constitution states a

62ror an explanation of the administrative agency functions, refer to
chapter t"WO, pages seven and eight.

• • .--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
ConsulsJ-to all Casas of admiralty and maritime JurisdictionJ-to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Part7J-to Controversies between two or nx>re statesJ-between a State and Citizens of
another StateJ-between citizens of different StatesJ-between Citizens
of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of dif"ferent states, and
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citisena,
or Subjects.
In all Cases affecting .Ambassadors, other public M'inistera and
Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the 1JUpreme Court
shall have original Jurisdiction. In all other cases before mentioned,
the 8Upreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law
and Fact, with such ~eptions, and under such Regulations as the
Congress shall make.
The Supreme Court in all the peramal appeaNn.ce cases has appellate
jurisdiction.

This means that the case mat involve •tters within its

jurisdiction and that the case must be brought on appeal to ti. Supreme
Court of the United

states.

The Supreme Court reviews law and tact under

the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

The first federal district court decision regarding student appearance

•s made in Burnside v.

&rara. 64

In September,

1964, a

students wore treedom buttons (which bad the vcrds "One

group

van

or Negro

One Vote• and

"SNCC") to the Brooker T. W&sbington High School in Mississippi.

The
i

principal, Mr. Moore, announced that the buttons were not to be 'WOrn in

school or in class.

6Ju • s. Const. art. III I 2.
64363 F. 2 d 744 (1966).

I!

Mr. Moore believed that this disciplinary regulation was necessary
because the buttons did not have any bearing on their education and would
cause a commotion in the school.

It is interesting to note that previously

Beatle buttons and His-Her buttons were worn in school and that no discipUnary action was taken to prohibit their display.

Student Handbook, 1962-1963.

He a1so referred to the

Paragraph G states:

Regulations for Studt?nt Conduct:
Discipline is looked upon by the administration as a means to accomplish
two primary purposes:
{a} to insure students and teachers against annoying, distracting
or disorderly conduct which results in the loss of valuable time
and learning opportunitiesJ
(b) to help d~elop w.t thin each student the capacity for enlightened
self control.
On September 21, 1964, three or four students wore the buttons.

vrere given the opportunity to remove them.
home.

They

The three who re.fused were sent

The next day all were back in school without the buttons.

On Septem-

ber 24, 1961h Mr. Moore was sw:mnoned to a class where thirty c:e forty students
were displaying the buttons.
or going home.

They nre given a choice of removing the buttons

The majority went home and were suspended for a week.

A

letter concerning the suspension was sent home.
All the parents, except for Mrs. Burnside, Mrs. English, and Mrs. Morris,

cooperated with the school.
under la U. S. C. A.

65rd. at 746.

-

These three ladies instituted civil rights action

I 1983 {1964) for a preliminary injunction pursuant to

28

u. s. c.

regulation.

A.I 1343 (1964) to prevent school officials from enforcing the
Section 1983 atatesr

F.very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citisen or the United States or other
person with1.n the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or imnam1t1ea secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an aM1on at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

Thia section protects the •rights, privileges, and 1mmnitiea secured b:r
67 Section 13h3 establlahes
the Court and La198" guaranteed to an individual.

the court's jurisdiction.
The ladies also believed that the school regulation abridged the

children's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and as a result it was an
unreasonable rule.

fha First Amendment guarantees freedom o.f e:xpresaion

.from congressional abridgement.

The Fourteenth

.Amendment guarantees that

"No state shall make or enforce an7 law which shall abridge the privileges
or imlllnitiea of citizens of the United StatesJ nor shall any State depriYe
any person or lite, liberty', or property, without due process of lawJ nor

den)" to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the la111~P8

6642 u. s. c. A.I 198.3 (1964).

68u. s. Const. amend. XIV.

67Id.

The Court of Appeals' reasoning

was intricate but logical. The First

Amendment embraces the right to commnicate a matter of vital pnbllc conoem

and to protect the right against intringement b)" state otticials.

The Negro

studEnts who attended an all Negro high school wore the .treedo.m buttons to
encourage their comm.mity to exercise their civil rights.

Although the Fourteenth Amendment protects the First .Amendment rights of
citizens "against the State itself and all of its creatures-Boards ot F.ducation not excepted," the First Amendment right or treedom of speech can be

abridged by state officials to protect state interests. 69 In lltmside v.

Bxs!,

the students were only mildly curious about the .freedom hlttons J

there was no col'lDllOtion nor disruption of classroom decoru.m.70 As a result,
no state interest had to be protected.

The Court of Appeals held that the

school regulation prohibiting students 1 from wearing freedom bll.ttona was
arbitrary and unreasonable, that it was an infringement or constitutionally'

protected rights, and that the lower court abused its discretion by refusing
to grant an injunction.

In conclusion, Circuit Judge Gew.1n designated the court's position by
sayingt

·we 'Wish to make it quite clear that we do not applaud any attempt to
undermine the authority of the school. We support all efforts made
b;y the school to fashion reasonable regulations for the conduct of

69)63 F. 2 d 7441 748 (1966).
70J:d.

-

[,

thair students and enforcement of the punishment incurred 'When such
regulations are violated. Obedience to duly conati tuted authority

is a valuable tool, and respect for those in authority met be instilled in our young people.
But, with all or this in mind, we must also emphasize that
school officials cannot ignore expressions of feelings with which
they do not wish to contend. They cannot infringe on their students'
right to free and unrestricted expression as guaranteed to them
under the First Amendment to the Constitution, where the exercise of
such rights in the school buildings and schoolrooms do not materially"
and substantially interfere with the regyirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.n
The same court on the

same

day reviewed Blackwell v. Iff!9Uen& Countz

Board of Fducation. 72 On Januaey- 291 196' approximately thirty pupils at

the all-Negro Henry Weather High School in Miasisaippi wore freedom badges.
Some of these pupils were creating a disturbance by noisily talking in the
hall.

Three of these pupils were brought to the principal's office to be

told no one 11>uld be permitted to cause a disturbance and that they were to
remove the buttons.

On February l,

1965, one

hundred firty- pupila 110re

freedom buttons and forcibq pinned the badges on them.
Mr. Jordan, assembled the pupils in the cafeteria.

were forbidden to wear the buttons at school.
courteous and hostileJ they called

Mr.

The principal,

He told them that they

Several students wre dis-

Jordan an "Uncle Tom.•

72363 F. 2 d 749 (1966).

7lrd. at 749.
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The next day two hundred pupils y;ore 1)uttons.

They were assembled in

the gym, were reminded of the rule prohibiting freedom buttons, and were told
if they wore them in school, they would be suspended.
pupils wore the buttons.

broke loose.

On February

The principal suspended them.

31 1965 1

At this point, chaos

Some pupils entered classrooms urging others to go home.

driver entered the building and passed out buttons.
through the windows.

""ventually order was restored.

Buttons

'l"ler~

A bus

thrown

Three hundred pupils

were suspended for the remainder of the school year after they did not return
to school in twenty days.
Meanwhile, the parents met
agreement was reached.
action under 42

u. s. c.

~~th

On April 1,
A.

thP superintendent and principal, but no

1965,

the parents sought civil rights

! 1983 (1964) to enjoin pursuant to 23 u. s. c. A.

I 1343 (1964) school officials from enforcing a regulation forbidding freedom
badges as a denial of li'irst and Fourteenth Ammdment rights.

relief' and the decision

'~as

The court denied

appealed.

There is a similarity bet'\11.roen the Burnside and Blackr1ell cases. 73

In

both civil rights oases, the parents allegated thl!t the school rule prohibiting the wearing of freedom badges vias an unreasonable and arbitrary rule that
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
port.ant difference between the two cases.

However, there is also an im-

Student disorder and confusion

73363 F. 2 d 744 (1966); .363 F. 2 d 749 (1966).
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resulted in the Blackwell case when the freedom badges were worn.74 There
was no student disorder in the Burnside case.

75

The Court of Appeals rPAsoned that the constitutional guarantee of liberty of expression does not grant an absolute right to speak, and that the
law recognized that there can be an abuse of freedom of speech.

In the

Blackwell case because students were :forcing their views on others, they were
abusing their constitutional guarantees. 76 The rights of an individual may
not take precedence over the rights of the majority.

The school regulation was also examined.

A reasonable regulation is one

which is "essential in maintaining order and discipline on school property••
• and • • • 'Which measurably contributes to the maintenance of order and de-

corum within the educational system." 77 The rule forbidding the wearing of
freedom buttons was necessary to maintain discipline.
For these reasons, relief wns denied.
Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District was a hair style ease.78

74
363

(i'.

2 d

749 (1966).

?5363 F. 2 d 7L4 (1966).

76
363 F. 2 d 749 (1966).
77&

at 753.

78261 F. Supp. 516 (1966).
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Phillip Ferrell, Stephen Vlebb 1 Paul Jarvis, their mothers, and their agent,
Kent Alexander, on September 11
instead of their homerooms.

19661

reported to the principal's office

The purpose of their visit was

to confer with

Mr. Lanham even though they understood that admission would be dm.ied be-

cause of their hair styles.

Mr. Lanham refused to admit them and advised

them to get their hair cut or trimmed before coming back to enroll.

The boys, members of a combo called Sounds Unlimited, insisted that they
were under contract with lfr. Alexander to maintain a certain style of dress
and appearance.

Instead

of getting a hair cut, they went to several other

Dallas high schools seeking to transfer but were advised by Mr. Lanham that
it 11as too late to apply tor a transfer.

The boys then went to the Adminis-

tration Building of the Dallas Independent School District to sM the super-

intendent, Dr. White.

On the steps of the building, Paul Jarvis met

Mr.

Allen, the assistant superintendent. Paul was told that there was no rule
conoem.ing hair length.

'1'he policy - . that each principal determined the

building's code of discipline. Later in a phone conversation with the
plaintiffs' attorney, Dr. White advised them he would stand behind his principal.
Paul Jarvis also said

Mr. Lanham first told

him he 1IOUl.d be admitted in

school but would have to have his hair trimmed in a couple of days.

However,

the next day lfr. Lanham told Jarvis that the matter had been reconsidered
and that he would not be adm:I. tted until his hair was trimmed.
On September 81

19661 the boys tried to enroll again.

lfr. Lanham refused

49
to enroll them because of their Beatle hair styles. Meanwhile, Mr. Alexander
notified three television stations and half a dozen radio stations of the
boys• enrollment difficulties.

Mr. Lanbam1

A..f'ter the unsuccessfUl conference with

the group ccm.dueted interviews.

Their st017 •s reported on all

the television channels complete with film and interviews.
there was local and national newscoverage.

In addition,

Later on the same day, the combo

recorded a song entitled "Keep Your Hands Off of It" 'Which •s distributed
by

Mr. Alexander to the local radio stations.
The boys' parents instituted the court proceedings claiming that Mr.

Lanham 1s action was arbitrary, discriminating, and violated their constitutional rights.

The court's jurisdiction was based on section one of Amend-

1964, Public Law 88-3S2, Title
partioulari:cy 8 I 19811 198) 1 and 2000 a (1964).

ment Fourteen and the Civil Rights Act of

42, u. s. c.

A. and

Section 1981 statesa
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the .full and
equal benetit of all lawa and proceedings tor the security of persons and propert7 as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalti'~' taxes, licenses, and aiactions of nery kind, and to no other.

Section 1983 protects the individual from any deprivation of "rights,
80
privileges, or 1.mnnnitiee secured by the Constitution and laWB."

u. s. c.
Bola u. s. c.

79ia

A.

I 1981 (1964).

A. I 1983

(1964).

And section 2000 a-1 statesi
All persons shall be entitled to be free, at any establishment
or place, from discrimination or segregation of any kind on the ground
of race, color, religion, or national origin, it such discrimination
or segregation is or purports to be required by any law, statute, o~
dinance, regulation, ruleeior order of a State or an:y agency or political. subdivision thereof.
The defendants claimed that there was no question involving United States

laws nor the United states Constitution.

They also claimed that the boys had

not exhausted the administrative remedies.

The court used the three part validity test to review this case. The
legislature delegated the school the authority to regulate the public educational system thus establishing the school's authority.

The rule was issued

pursuant to the proper procedure.
To demonstrate that the rule was not arbitrary nor unreasonable, the
court referred to Leonard v. School Committee of Attleboro. 82 In this case,

the possibility of disruption was sufficient to establish that hair style
regulations were not arbitrary nor unreasonable.
In addition, no rights of the students were deprived because there wre

indications from earlier school incidenta that trouble would have occurred
had the boys wearing Beatle hair cuts been permitted to enroll in school.

The district court indicated its position
8l

42 u. s. c.

82349 Mass.

A.

704,

I

2000 a-l

by

saying:

(1964).

212 N. E. 2 d

468, 14

A. L. R. 3 d 1192

(1965).
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One of the most important aims of the school should be to educate
the individual to live sucoesafull.1" with other pecp1e in our democracy.
Since the school authorities, by legislative grant, control the public
educational system, their regulations play a part in the educational
process. This is but another way of stating that society expects
8)
public education to concem itself w1 th building young citizens • • • •
Relief was denied.

-

The court's a.na'.cysis of the situation differs remarkably from the Burn-

!!.2!, and Blackwell

84
interpretations.

In these two cases, the court required

that actual disruption be evidenced to justi.f.'.r any restriction.

In the

Ferrell case, the court abandoned this procedure and instead held that actions

of school officials are not limited to actual disruption. S) The possibility
of disruption was sufficient to regulate.
This raises a new issue.

Ir the

administration, faculty., and general

public cause a disruption or suggest the possibility of a disruption, can the
individual's constitutionally protected rights be abridged?

This point was answered in Terminello v. City ot Chicago. 66 Terminello,
advertised as a Catholic Priest, he later was found to be suspended by his

Bishop, -was brought to Chicago to address a racist group called the Christian

Veterans of America.

In his address, "Christian Nationalism. or ·world Co:mmn-

83261 F. Supp. Sl6, SS2 (1966).

84
363 F. 2 d 7hh (l966)J 363 F. 2 d 7.49 (1966).
BS 261 F. Supp. Sl6 (1966).
86
69 S. Ct. 8941 93 L. F.d. 1131 (1949).

nism-mrl..ch?", he attacked the New Deal, "Queen" Eleanor, and the mob outside
87
the auditorium as "sliJV scum, snakes, and bedbugs."
&t he did !!,21 encourage violence on the part of his people.
Terminello was arrested because anyone who "• ••aid ed • • • in making
any improper noise, riot, disturbance, breach of the peaoe, or diversion
tending to a breach of the peace, within the limits of tbe city••• shall
be deemed guilty of disorderzy- conduct. • • .n

dollard by the Hmicipal Court of Chicago.

88 He was fined one hundred

He appealed to the Illinois

Supreme Court, then to the Appellate Court, and .f1nally to the United States
Supreme court.
The United States Supreme Court noted that although speech is often pro-

vocative and challenging, Termi.nello did not invite action from his people.
Instead, he received a reaction from the mob outside.
by indicating that

The court concluded

the court mat protect the individual

from censorship or

punishment unless a clear and present danger above public inconvenience,
annoyance, or unrest existed.

Davis v. Firment was a hair style case. 89 Haward Davis violated a
school regulation prohibiting long, shaggy hair and/or sideburns.

87

Id. at 89S.
88Id.
89

269 F. Supp. $24 (1967).

On Sep..

S.3
tember 9th and 12th, 1966 Howard was told by at least two of his teachers
that his hair was excessively long.

On September 12th and l)th1

1966, the

principal issued bulletins with the regulation.
Finally on September

13, 19661 Howard was suspended for three days

because he did not comply w.i th the regulation.

Thereafter, be _, au.apended

tor w:Ul.1'll.q disobeying the principal 1s instruction.
On September 22, 1966,. Mr. Davia unsucoeas.fully attempted to have Howard

reinstated. Readmission was refused. Later

»r.

Davis, &.rd, and their

attomey met with the superintendent, t1IO assistant superintendent., and the
prlncipal.

However1 no settlement was reached.

A petition of rniew of the

superintendent's deciaion was presented to the board.

The Orleans Parish

School Board wnt on record with the superintendent and principal

readmtesion to Howard unless he obtained a hair out.

ae

re.fusing

Cb September 28 1

1966,

Howard was readmitted art.er be had a hair out.

The suit was brought under the Civil Rights Act, Title
1981 (1964) and juriadiction was sought under h2

u. s. c.

la u. s. c.

A. 1968

A. I

(1964) on

the grounds that the action violated the First, Eighth, Ninth, .and FOUl"teenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution.
Section 1981 provides for equal rights under the law.
lines the proceedings in vindication of civil righta.

Section 1988 out-

It states•

The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the
district courts • • • tor the protection of all persons in the United

States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be
exercised and enforced in con.formity 1i. th the la1f8 of the United
States, so .tar as such la118 are suitable to carry the same into
ef'fectJ but in all cases 'Where they are not adapted to the object,
or are deficient in the provisions necessary to to.mish suitable
remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified. and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State
wherein the court having jurisdiction of such oi'Vil or criminal
cause is held, so .tar as the same is not inconsistent with the
Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to
and goyern the said courts in the trial and disposition ot the
ca.use, and, if' it is or a criminal nature, in the 1nf'l.1ct:ton of
punishment on the party fOund guilty.90
The court applied the three part validity test. Since the state lad
granted the school board and ita representatives the authority" to make regulations, there was no abu.se of power.

Louisiana law also gives the school

principal the right to suspend any pupil guilty of deliberate disobedience.
Howard Davis was suspended because he dellberate:cy- diaobe;red the principal.

The proper procedure was followed.

llr. Davis,

Howard, and

their attor-

ney bad the opportunity to meet with the administration and with the school

board. The regulation was considered reasonable because
had fought about hair styles.

previou~

The three part valldit;y test

studaita

was f'1l:filled.

The court reasoned that since hair is not symbolic of anything1 1t is
not an expression guanmteed by the First Amendment tho.a answering one allegation.

The plaintiffs next claimed that a right to privacy was established in

9042

u. s. c.

A. I 1988 (1964).

\
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Griswold v. Connecticut. 91 The court agreed that this case did establish

marital privacy as a sacred and fundamental right even though marital priva.ey
is not specified in the Constitution.

&it it noted that a hair style could

not be equated with marital privacy as a fundamental and sacred right protected by the Ninth Amendment which reads, "The enumeration in the Constitu-

tion of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others

retained by the people."92

The court further noted that the Eighth Amendment was not violated because no cruel and unu8ll41 punishment was administered.

Finally, the court

observed that the Fourteenth Amendment right of due proeeas of law •a not
violated.

Therefore, because no constitutional right buttressed by the

Civil Rights Act •s at issue, relief was denied.
Tinker v. DesMoines Independent Co!llmlnity School District is the la.st
student appearance case to be reviewed in the chapter. 93
in chronological order since in

1968

'l'his case is not

it was appealed to the United States

Supreme Court.
In December,

1965, school of.ficials llere told that several students wre

planning to wear black a.rm bands to school to express their belie.ta relating

91
381

u. s. 479 (1965).
92u. s. Const. amend. IX

93258 F. Supp. 971 (1966) 1 aff'd., 393

u. s.

$03 (1969).
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to the war in Viet Nam.

A regulation prohibiting arm bands on school property

was promulgated by achool officials and supported by the board of education.
Arter the regulation •s passed, John F. Tinker, Mary Beth Tinker, Paul
Tinker, Hope Tinker, and Christopher Eckhardt wore the arm bands to school

"to moum those who had died in the Viet Nam war and to support Senator Robert
F. Kennedy's proposal that the truce pi-oposed for Christmas Day, 1965, be
extended indefinitely."94 All of the children. lmew of the school regulation.

They' all were BUspended and each returned to school after the Christmas holiday vacation without the arm bands.

Mr. and Mrs. Tinker acting in behalf of their children took action against

the school district, its board of directors, and certain administrative offi-

cials and teachers to recover nominal damages and obtain an injunction against
enforcement of a regulation prohibiting the wearing of black arm bands on
school :taeili ties pursuant to provisions of
Jurisdiction •s sought under 28

u. s.

C.. A.

L2 u. s. c. A. I 1983 (1964).

I 1.343 (1964)

on the grounds that

their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated.
The federal district court in their reply began with the assumption that
freedom of speech is not absolute..

It said,, "The abridgement of speech by a

state regulation mst al•YB be considered in terms or the object the regulation is attempting to accomplish and the abridgement of speech that actually

-

94rd. at 972.
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ocoure."9S

The court further aaidl

A subject should never be excluded from the classroom merely
because it ia controversial. It ia not unreasonable, however, to
regulate the introduction and discussion of such subjects in the
classroom. ••While the arm bands themselves may not be disruptive,
the reactions and comments t.rom other students as a result or the
arm bands would be likely to disturb the disciplined atmosphere
required for any classroom. It was not unreasonable in this instance for school officials to anticipate tha~ the wearing of arm
bands would create some type of classroom disturbance. The school
officials involved had a reasonable basis for adopting the arm band
regulation. • • .On the other hand, the plaintiff's freedom of speech
is infringed upon only to a limited extent. They are still free to
wear arm bands oft achool premises. In ad.di tion, the plaintiffs are
tree to express their views on the Viet Nam sr during any orderly
discussion ot that subject. It is vitally important that the interest of students such as the plaintiffs in current affairs be encouraged whenever possible. In this instance, however, it is the
disciplined atmosphere of the classroom, not the plaintiffs' right
to wear arm bands on school premises, which ia entitled to the protection of the law.96
Although the plaintiffs cited Burnside v. B.yars and Blackwell v. Issa~ena

County Board of Education, the court did not teel these decisions wre

binding. 91

However, these decisions were to be treated 'With respect.

The

court concluded by sayinga
.it is the view of the Court that actions of school officials in
this realm should not be limited to those instances whe;re there is a
•

$

9Srd.

96rd. at 973.
97363 F. 2 d 7h4 (1966)J .363 F. 2 d 749 (1966).

SB
material or substantial interference with school discipline. School
officials met be given a wide discretion and if1 under the circumstances, a disturbance in school discipline is reasonably calQUlated
to prevent such a disruption, it must be upheld by the Court. 96
The court found that the regulation was reasonable and did not deprive the
plaintiffs of their constitutional rights of freedom of speech and due process
of law.

The Tinkers appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of the United
States.

The court accepted the decision .fbr review.

Justice Fortas in

delivering the court's opinion stated the conflict that had to be settled
when he said, "Our problem lies in the area where students in the exercise
of F1rst Amendment rlghts collide with the rules of the school authorities.n99
The major:i ty recognized that the court in previous cases had emphasized
the need for school authorities to prescribe and control conduct in the school

and that the district court feared turmoil because United States involvement
in Viet Nam was a controversial topic."

But our Constitution says we must

take this risk• • • and our history says that it is this sort of hazardous
f'reedom-this kind of openness-that is the basis of our national strength
a.nd of the independence and vigor

or Americans

who grow up and live in this

relatively permissive, orten disputatious society.nlOO

982S8 F. Supp. 971, 973 (1966) 1 aff 1d, 393 U. S. 503 (1969).
99~.
l~. at 507.
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show that there is mre than a desire to avoid the unpleasantne• accompanying
To justify the prohibition or a constitutional right the state must

-

an unpopular viewpoint.

There •s no such finding in this case.

Not all

political symbols nor controversial symbols such as the Naai cross were proMore importantly, there •e no disturbance.

hibi ted.

!nstead1 1t appeared

that the authorities w18hed to avoid present day controversial attars.

For

example, earlier an article about Viet Nam was banned from the school paper.

Justice Fortaa stated the majority opinion.

He said, •In our system, state-

operated schools may not be enclaves of totall tarianism.
do not possess absolute authority over their students.

School off'icials
Students in school

as well as out of achool are •persona' under our Constitution. ,.lOl
The majorl ty agreed that ideas may be expressed if' done without inter-

fering with the appropriate discipline in operation of the school.

In Tinker

v. DeaKoines Independent Commnnitr School District, the wearing of black arm
bands was a symbolic act within

the tree speech clause of the First .Amendment

and the arm bands were divorced from actual or potential dismptive bebavi~~
Concurring opinions were 1lr1tten by Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice
l 1Jhi te.

Justice Stewart was in agreement with the ajority except tor the

"Court's uncritical assumption that, school discipline aside, the First Amend-

-

lOl.Id.

102258 F. Bupp. 971, 973 (1966) 1 aff 1d, 393 U. S. $03 (1969).
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mmt rights of children are co-extenaive with those of adults."l03
Justice White - . in basic agreement w1th the majoritJ' except tor theee
two points.

He noted that all acts impinge on some valid state interest, but

that the state baa no right to take away .freedom ot speeoh because they have
a dnty to educate.

Justice White also did not agree wlth tha Bum!ide v.

BYar§ decieion which was cited by" the •joriv to reach their decision.lOh

It appeara that Justice White thought the majority lacked sutticient forcef\tlneas in their poaition.
lfr. Justice Black and

».r.

Justice Harlan each wrote a diasenting opinion.

Justice Black began by" stating that .freedom of speech 18 llmited by" the public
good.

He further noted that there was some disruption 1n classroom routine

becauae ot the arm bands.

Justice Black then concluded that unless the court

retumed to the reasonableness test as used by" the state courts, a new era

ot permiHiveness 1n which the schools will be told by the students what to
teach would begin.

Justice Harlan wrote 1n his dissenting opinion that he did not feel the

regulation was :motivated other than by legitimate school concerns. However,
he did not define the 11mita ot 'What school eoncems are in restricting per-

SU.
l0h363 F. 2 d 7b4 (1966).
lOJid. at
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sonal rights and liberties.
In

sunary, the federal district courts have jurisdiction to hear cases

where Congress has spee1.f'lcal.ly given them the authority to do so.
I 1.34.3 grants the court jurisdiction.

TJ.Ue 28

The individual is granted relief if

he can show he is entitled to relief because the Civil Rights Act of 1964

was violated and if the regulation tails the three part validity test.
The reader should be cautioned that in the cases 1n this chapter, the
courts are only concerned with the rul.e-aldng function

or the

school board

and not the adjudicative function.
Althollgh the Supreme Court bas original. jurisdiction in special areas,
1n all personal appearance cases, it baa appellate juried1ction.

The case

mat involve attera within its jurisdiction and the case mat be brought on
appeal.

The Supreme Court review law and tact which have been decided in

the lower court under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

All litigation oonceming student dress and appearance rights at the
federal court level has occurred since Congress passed the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. There were two instances of parents on behalf of their children
attempting to enjoin school boards .t'rom making rules which prohibited the
wearing of freedom badges in school.
action brought under 42

u. s. c.

Both of these cases wre civil rights

A. I 1983 (1964) and 28

u. s. c.

A. I 134.3

(1964). Both also claimed that the regulation denied them their First and
Fourteenth .Amendment rights.
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In 1966, in the case of Ihmside v. Byars, the Court of Appeals in

reversing the lower court held that the school regulation was arbitrary and
unreasonable. 105' F\J.rthermore1 it was an infringement of constitutionally
protected rights.

On the same day, the same Court of Appeals revie'Wed

Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Fdueation. 1o6 In this case, the
court reasoned that t.reedom o:f' expression is not absolute because the students were abusing their constitutional guarantees by forcing their views
on others.

And that the rights of an individual may not taka precedence

over the rights of the majority.

The court noted that because the school

regulation was necessary to maintaining discipline, it was a reasonable one.
For these reasons, relief was denied.
The

two hair style cases were brought under different section of the

1964, Ferrell v. Dallas Ind!JPendent School District was
42 I I 1981, 1983• and 2000 a of the Civil Rights Act of

Civil Rights Act of

based on Title
1964.107 The court applied the three part validity test and found that the
school board had the authority to regulate, that the proper procedure was
followed., and that the regulation was reasonable.

No student rights ivere

deprived because there were indications that if the boys had been permitted

lOSrd.

-

lo6363 F. 2 d 749 (1966).
107261 F. Supp. 516 (1966).
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to enroll, trouble would have occurred.
The court •s analysis of the Ferrell case differs .t'rom the &rnside and

Blackwell interpretations.108 In &.rnside and Blackwll, actual disruption
had to be evidenced to justi:t'Y any restriction. 109 In Ferrell, the possibility ot disrnption was suf'.f'icient to regul.ate. 110 This raises a new issue.

Can an individual's rights be abridged if the public's reaction to him is
disrupti'Ve? According to Term:l.nello v. City of Chica19. the court concluded
that the individual's rights mst be protected tram censorship or punishment
unless there was a clear and present danger other than public inconvenience,
annoyance or unrest. ll1
DavU v. Firgmt was the other hair style case.ll2 Suit •s brought
under the Civil Rights Act o:t 1964 under Title

b2 I I 1981

and 1988

an the

grounds that the action violated the First, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth

Amendments of the United States Constitution. The court reasoned that since
hair is not symbolic of anything, it is not an expression guaranteed by the
First Amendment.

It also noted that although the Ninth Amendment protects

lo826l F. Supp. 5L5 (1966)J 363 F. 2 d 744 (1966)J 36.3 F. 2 d 749 (1966).

l09363 F. 2 d 744 (1966)J 363 F. 2 d 749 (1966).
ll0261 F. SUpp. 5L5 (1966).
lJ.169 S. Ct. 8941 93 L. FA.. ll31 (1949).
112269 F. Supp. 524 (1967).

such sacred and fundamental rights as marital privacy, hair style cannot be
equated to arital privacy.

ment

The court further noted that the Eighth Amend-

•a not violated because no cruel and unusual punishment •a enforced.

And last:cy-1 the Fourt.eenth Amendment waa not 'Violated because no constitutional right 111.s violated.

Relief •s denied.

The Tinker v. Dedoines l'nde,f!!!dent Communitl School Diatrlct case •s
reviewed at the federal district level and by the United States supreme
court.113 Suit 111.a brought tor nominal damages and to obtain injunctive
relief pursuant to Title

42 I 1983

and Title 28

I l3la3

en the grounda that

the First and Fourteenth Analdment rights wre violated.
The lower court found that it there is a possibility of disruption in

the school, school o.ttioial.e 1111St be given a wide discretion in •king preventive regulations.

It al.eo stated that the disciplined ataoaphere of a

classroom, not the individual's rights, had precedent and protection of the

law.
The Suprene Court re'ri.ned the case on appeal.

The majority opinion,

written by Justice Fortaa, reasoned that to justify the prohibition ot a con-

stitutional right, the state mat show that there 1a more than a desire to
avoid the unpleaaantneas acoompan'1rtg an unpopular viewpoint.

There was none

shown in this case. Furthermore, ideas may be expressed i f they cause no

ll32$8 F. Supp. 971 (1966) 1 a.t'f 1d1 393 U. S. 503 (1969).

disruption of discipline.
the First Amendment.

Black arm bands are symbolic acts protected by

For these reasons, the court found for the plaintiffs.

Concurring opinions were written by Mr. Justice Stewart and lfr. Justice
White.

Mr. Justice Stewart was in agreement with the majority except for the

court's assumption that children's rights are co-extensive w.lth adult rights.
It appears that Justice White thought the majority lacked su:f.f'icient forcefulness in their position.

Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Harlan each

'W?'Ote

a dissenting opinion.

Justice Black felt that treedom of speech can be lim1 ted by the public good.

He also noted that unless the court returned to the reasonableness test as
used by the state court, a new era of permissiveness would begin.
Harlan

'W?'Ote

that he felt the regulation was motivated

Justice

by legitimate school

ooncems.
The limited number

or

student appearance litigation at the .federal court

level can be attributed to the complexity o.f constitutional issues.

For ex-

ample, the First Amendment's protection of freedom of speech is difficult to

de.fine.

In United States v. O'Brien, O'Brien burned his selective service

card to express his anti-war views. 114 O'Brien claimed that his constitutional guarantee of symbolic speech was violated because he was arrested for
knowingly destroying or mutilating a selective service certificate.

114aa s.

Ct. 1673, 20 L. F.,d. 2 d 672 (1968).

Chief
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Justice 1''arren, representing the majority of eight justices, pointed out that
the government had a substantial interest; and that burning the selective
service ca.rd was sufficiently frustrating to the government's interest to

uphold the conviction. As a result, the court dismissed the idea that all
types of symbolic conduct are protected under the First Amendment.

In the Burnside and Blackwell cases, freedom badges were recognized as
symbolic speech.ll5 And in the Tinker case, black arm bands were recognized
as Sj1lllbolic speeeh. 116 Both the freedom badges and the black arm bands rei>resented an ideal.

However, in the Fe?Tell and Davis eases, hair was not
recognized as symbolic speech because it did not stand for anything. 117
The Ninth Amendment sa7s,, "The enumeration in the Constitution, of cer-

tain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained

by

the people."118 Doee this Amendment protect the right to determine your personal appearance as a .fundamental and sacred right? According to the court
in Davis v. Firment, the right to determine hair styles is not sacred nor
119
.fundamental.

l.J5363 F. 2 d 744 (1966)J 363 F. 2 d 749 (1966).
ll6258 F. Supp. 971 (1966) 1 aff 1 d, 393 U. S. 503 (1969).
ll7261 F. Supp. 545 (1966}J 269 F. Supp. 524 (1967).

118u.

s.

Const. amend. II

ll9269 F. Supp. 524 (1967).
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The nebulousness of the Fourteenth Amendma'lt presents more difficulties.
Some people interpret the Fourteenth Amendment as protecting the First Ansndment right of freedom of speech because of the words " • • • nor sha.U any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law. • • • ttl20

The word liberty may connote f'reedom of speech,, but it

also may connote other .freedoms,
Another explanation for limited cases a.t the federal level may be the

Civil Rights Act.
appeals.

Since its enactment in

1964,

the courts have reviewed six

This vrould indicate that more litigation will be brought to the

federal level.

Then again, until the Supreme Court resolved the con.flict

between actual disruption versus potential disruption, JDEIJ'lY people did not
bring litigation.

Still another reason .f'or limited litigation might be public agreement
with the school rules and regulations.

Perhaps, the administrative agency

or lower courts successfully resolved the issues.

Or an alternative might

be that it was easier to comply with the rule or regulation than to litigate.
The following conclusions may be reached after analyzing the cases 1n
this chapter:

(1) the school board's right to make rules that regulate etu-

1
1

I

dent dress and appearance was established, (2) the court used

tre

United

States Constitution and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to determine the constitutionality of an issue, (3) the court also applied the three part valid.it

12n..
-u.

s.

Const. amend. XIV

!!

1
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test to determine the legality of a school regulation or rule, (4) in

~

side v. 'Byars and in Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Fducation, freedom badges were recognized as symbolic speech, (5) in the Burnside and Black-

-

well cases, the court used actual violence as a basis for abridging symbolic
freedom of speech, (6) in Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District,

potential disruption was recognized as sufficient cause to abridge constitutionally guaranteed freedoma 1 (7) in Davis v. Firment, hair was not recognized as symbolic speech, (8) in Tinker v. DesMoines Independent Community
School District,, the Supreme Court recognized black arm bands as symbolic
speech protected by the First Amendment, and (9) in the Tinker case, the
Supreme Court agreed that the black arm bands were divorced from potential
and actual disruption, therefore no clear and present danger was shown as
121
grounds to abridge a constitution~ protected right.

121
363 F. 2 d 744 {1966); 363 F. 2 d 749 {1966)J ~1·J 261 F. Supp. 5L5
(1966); 269 F. Supp. 524 (1967)J 258 F. supp. 971 (196 , arr•d, 393 u. s.
503 {1969) J .!.5!·

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this thesis is to trace the development of court
decisions in the United States which have infiuenced and determined students•
personal appearance rights in public high schools between 1900 and 1968.
Be.fore summarizing the development of these decisions, it is necessary to
review the school board's and court's roles.
The school board is recognized as a specialized administrative agency
capable of rule making, enforcement, and adjudication within the authority
granted by the legislature and limited by the federal and state constitutions.
Its purpose is to manage the schools so that the process of education ma.y
suocessf\J.l.ly continue.
The individual has recourse to judicial review if he believes that the
administrative action has violated his rights.

Normally, the lower court will

only review the administrative action when the proper legal procedure is .fol-

lowed.

If the administrative remedies are not adequate., the court will disre-

gard the normal legal procedure.

To revie;v rule making, the state courts use the three part validity test

to determine if the regulation was

n

• • .{a) within the granted power, (b)

69
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issued pursuant to proper procedure, and (c) reasonable."

122

To review the

areas of enforcement and adjudication, the court uses the substantial-evidence
rule.

!!Xtraordinary remedies are also available to enforce a right or to

prevent a violation of the individual's rights.
be

The court's purpose should

rememberedJ it is to be certain that there is no abuse of power by the

school board and its representatives.
The pre-depression oases discussed in chapter two established certain

precedents. One was the school board's right to make rules that regulate
student dress and appearance. Another precedent was that the court accepted
the three part validity test as a standard to determine the legality of the
school board rule.

Although the use of proper procedure was stressed by the

questioned by the court majority
in V§lentine v, Ind.ependent Schoo1 Distriot. 123

court, the rule's reasonableness was

on~

The post-depression oases analyzed in chapter three enforced the school
board's right to regu.lateJ they also confirmed the court's use of the three
part validity test in determining the legality of the regulation. In the
earlier oases, the court emphasized that the administrative agency had the
granted authority and followed the proper procedure. In the post-depression
cases, the court's emphasis •s placed on the reasonableness of the rule.

122Davis at 87.
l231a7 Ia. 555. li74 N. w. 334 (19l.9)J 191 Ia. 1100, 183 N. w. 434 (1921),

n
And lastly, the concept that community rights were paramount to individual
rights was introduced by the court in Akin v. Board of Education of Riverside

Unified School District. 124

In the author's opinion, one post-depression decision, Mitchell v. McCall, was a violation of consU tuUonally protected religious rights because
the ata te limited fulene • s religious freedom. 125 Under certain circumstances
when the majority rights are paramount or when a clear and present danger is

evident, it is necessary to limit the rights of an individual.

was no evidence that either situation existed in this case.

But, there

If the case had

been appealed to a federal court, it would have been interesting to note the
federal court's decision.
By

19681 the state court position was clearly defined. In general, the

court felt that:

The decision of such board, if exercised in good faith, on matters
affecting the good order and discipline of the school is final as far
as it relates to the rights of pupils to enjoy school privileges, and
the courts l'fil1 not interfere with the exercise of such authority unless
it bas been illegally or unreasonably exercised; but the courts 1'ill interfere to prevent the enforcement of a rule which deprives a pupil of
rights to which the law entitles him, or which tends to alienate the
pupil from proper parental authority, or which manifes~ reaches beyond the school board's powers, or beyond its sphere of acUon, and relates to subjects 1n no •Y connected with the management or successful
operation of the school, or which is plainly calculated to subve1} gr
retard the leading object of the school legislation of the state. 2

121.J6a Cal. Rptr. S57 {1968).

125273 Al.a. 6o4, 143 so. 2 d 629, 632 {1962).
12679 c. J. s. Schools and School Districts I 494 (19$2).
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The personal appearance cases in chapter four are concerned with the
rule naldng function of the school board.

The federal district courts have

jurisdiction to hear cases where Congress has specifically given them the
authority to do so.
jurisdiction.

The Civil Rights Act of

1964

grants the federal courts•

To review the regulation's legality, the court expects the

individual to show that he is entitled to relief because the Civil Rights

Act of

1964

was violated.

The court also applies the three pa.rt validity

test to the regulation.
Although the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in special areas,
in all personal appearance oases, it has appellate jurisdiction.

This means

the case mst involve matters within its jurisdiction and the case :rrust be
brought on appeal; the Supreme Court reviews law and f'act which have been
decided in the lower court.
The federal court cases established a criteria for abridging an individnal1s constitutional rights.

The court recognized

that when there is a

conflict bet"Ween the rights of many and the rights or an individual, the
individual's rights mst be abridged.

In hair style cases, the lower fed-

eral courts have found that the threat of potential disruption to be enough
cause to reasonably abridge the individual's rights.

However, the Supreme

Court in Tinker v. DesMoines Independent Community Soh$lol District indicated
that before freedom of symbolic speech be ourtaileC.1 there must be an actual

disruption.127 Badges and arm bands were accepted as symbolic speech, but

127258 F. Supp. 971 (1966), afftd, 393 U. S. 503 (1969).
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hair styles were rejected by the lower courts because they did not, in the
courts• opinions, symbolize anything.

The courts developed w1 th time a gradual and more liberal attitude.
First, it was necessary to establish the rights of the school board; next,
the proper procedure had to be followed; and thEl'l 1 the reasonableness of the
rule was questioned.

At present, the individual's constitutional right to

freedom of speech is deemed more vital than the potential disruption, it may
incite.

In the future, it is probable that the court will hold similar views

about freedom of dress.
FJVen though the court's position has changed and progressoo w.:!. th the
times, it is still criticized in some quarters for not doing enough or doing
too mch.

The ll?"iter has "traced the development of court. decisions in the
I

United States which have influenced and determined students• personal appear-

ance rights in public high schools between 1900 and 1968 so that educators,
students, and the general public be aware of the court's reasoning.

This

synopsis should be helpful not only to the student so that he may determine
his rights, but also to the educator who mst make and enforce school regulations.
Because the Supreme Court decision in Tinker v. Des:Moinea Independent
Communixz School District resolved a difference in legal interpretation at
the federal court level, there should be an influx of personal appearance
cases.

128

F.ach of these can and may modi:fY the position of the court.

The
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writer recommends that further research be conducted to account for and
analyze recent decisions.
future cases "Will primarily involve complex constitutional matters.
Since constitutional la:w is remarkably difficult to apply, concepts seem

to be fundamMtal and remarkably clear until they are applied to a real
life situation.

For these reasons, the writer recommends that only the

necessary legal background and interpretation be provided. for the reader.
In addition, the writer also recommends that future researchers be thoroughly familiar with legal research methods.

Finally, the writer recommends tha. t the findings of any future research
be ma.de available to educators, students, and the general public.

Many

misconceptions could be distilled if research results were readily accessible.
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